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Abstract
The Eurozone has faced repeated crises and has experienced profound transformations in the past years. This thematic
issue seeks to address the questions arising from the changing governance structure of the Eurozone. First, how have the
negotiations, pressures of the crises and reforms impacted the relationships between key actors like EU institutions and
Member States? Second, where did national positions come from and what role did domestic politics play in the negotia-
tions? And finally, to what extent has the evolution of Eurozone governance left room for adequate control mechanisms
and democratic debate? The articles in this issue highlight the developing role of Member States, domestic politics and
democratic and legal control mechanisms.
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1. Introduction
Eurozone governance was in the beginning of this cen-
tury dominated by an asymmetric institutional structure
mostly relying on a strong monetary pillar and fiscal
constraints stipulated in the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP; Howarth & Verdun, 2020). The contagion effect
of the international financial crisis painfully highlighted
the inadequacy of this governance structure and avail-
able response mechanisms, as Eurozone Member States
struggled to protect their economies and contain the
growth of public debt. In the course of successive crises
since 2007, a wide range of reform ideas were launched
to strengthen the governance structure with more inte-
grated financial, fiscal and economic policy tools (Chang,
2016). In parallel, the European Central Bank (ECB) intro-
duced non-standard measures to cushion the adverse
impact on banks.
Economic policy coordination was enhanced by the
so-called ‘Six-Pack,’ ‘Two-Pack’ and the Fiscal Compact,
which strengthened the SGP and introduced the
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. These reforms,
streamlined under the European Semester, were
intended to facilitate sanctions under the SGP, reinforce
fiscal discipline and make surveillance more elaborate
so that imbalances could be identified and addressed
earlier (Bauer & Becker, 2014).
The introduction of the multi-pillar structure of the
banking union was intended to reinforce the stability of
the European banking system, for example through a
single rule book for banks and several instruments for
Eurozone banks. The main objective was to break the
sovereign-bank doom-loop by putting financial institu-
tions under a common supervisory and resolution frame-
work and to create a common deposit insurance system
(Dehousse, 2016). The Single Supervisory Mechanism
and a Single Resolution Mechanism were adopted in
2013 and 2014, whereas political deadlock prevented
the adoption of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme
(Howarth & Quaglia, 2016). Likewise, agreements on
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detailed implementation of banking union components
such as the Single Resolution Fund, the financial back-
bone of the Single Resolution Mechanism, proved to
be problematic.
The crises also highlighted the lack of an effective
financial support structurewithin the Eurozone.Member
States created various bailout funds in and outside of
the EU legal framework with the European Stability
Mechanism becoming the centrepiece for Eurozone
assistance in 2012 (Ioannou, Leblond, & Niemann, 2015).
Between 2010 and 2015, EU and Eurozone Member
States channelled assistance through the European
StabilityMechanismandothermechanismsoften accom-
panied by International Monetary Fund support and
strict austeritymeasures. The ECB also createdmonetary
stabilisation instruments by enlarging its long-term lend-
ing operations and engaging in bond purchases on the
secondary market, with the latter creating controversy
on both the national and European level.
However, disagreements betweenMember States or
between national governments and European institu-
tions delayed some decisions and led to foot-dragging
and slow implementation of others, as is the case with
the banking union. A few years after the beginning of
the reform efforts, the so-called Five Presidents’ Report
called for new efforts in reforming Eurozone gover-
nance and for completing the Economic and Monetary
Union. Amongst other elements it particularly empha-
sised the need to establish the European Deposit
Insurance Scheme, a backstop for the Single Resolution
Fund and to setup a common fiscal capacity to cush-
ionmacroeconomic shocks (Juncker, 2015). However, dis-
agreement on the detailed design of these and other
issues remained and curtailed the reform process of
Eurozone governance.
The repeated crises faced by the Eurozone and the
profound transformations it has experienced raise impor-
tant questions that this thematic issue seeks to address.
First, how have the negotiations, pressures of the crises
and reforms impacted the relationships between key
actors like EU institutions and Member States? Second,
where did national preferences come from andwhat role
did domestic politics play in the negotiations? And finally,
towhat extent has the evolution of Eurozone governance
been accompanied by the creation of adequate control
mechanisms and democratic debate?
2. An Overview of This Thematic Issue
The first section of this issue examines the evolving roles
of European and national actors in Eurozone governance
and the continuous renegotiation of their influence and
relationship to other actors in the system.
Sacher (2021) analyses why the European Commis-
sion is reluctant to impose sanctions on Member States,
despite the importance of this tool for the Economic
and Monetary Union since its inception. In addition, pro-
visions on sanctions have empowered the Commission
and have become stricter in the aftermath of the finan-
cial and sovereign debt crises. An analysis of three post-
crisis cases using process-tracing methods in combina-
tion with a normative institutionalist analysis shows that
the Commission is reluctant to impose sanctions, as it
does not perceive punitive action as appropriate.
Rehm (2021) analyses the development of finan-
cial assistance in the Eurozone since 2010. His liberal
intergovernmentalist analysis finds that reforms to assis-
tance mechanisms are best explained by a re-occurring
pattern of mixed preferences. On the one hand, the
threat to Eurozone stability encouraged Member States
to expand and deepen the assistance formula. On the
other hand, potential creditors and debtors tried to
shield themselves from incurring direct costs or protect
their economies. The resulting reforms advanced finan-
cial support in size and scope but failed to effectively
address the difficulties at hand.
Kavvadia (2021) focuses on the role of the European
Investment Bank (EIB) in promoting a greener agenda
for EU development. She argues that the EIB’s announce-
ment of its metamorphosis into a ‘Climate Bank’ in the
context of the EU’s Green Deal makes it an important
actor in the EU’s climate agenda. She analyses the EIB’s
climate pivot by examining the bank’s rational interests
within a sociology of markets analytical framework and
uses a principal-agent model to illustrate the chang-
ing relationship between the European Commission and
the EIB.
The second section of this issue focuses on domestic
politics. The goal is to understand the factors that deter-
mine how national governments act at the European
level. The articles in this section contribute to the litera-
ture on the domestic politics of Eurozone reform, which
tends to analyse government preferences through the
prism of a competition between structural economic fac-
tors and political considerations (Tarlea, Bailer, & Degner,
2019; Van der Veer & Haverland, 2019).
Commain (2021) argues that national positions on
the EU’s adoption of harmonized capital requirements
between 2008 and 2010 can be explained by structural
factors and the ‘varieties of financial capitalism’ approach
(Howarth & Quaglia, 2013; Story & Walter, 1997).
Regulating banks, he argues, requires policy-makers to
balance restrictions of the risk-taking behaviour of banks
and the economy’s reliance on bank lending for growth.
Therefore, while governments generally support the pro-
posed increase of bank capital requirements, they seek
targeted preferential treatments aimed at preserving the
domestic supply of retail credit.
Van Loon (2021) applies a societal approach to govern-
mental preference formation inspired by Schirm (2018,
2020) to examine the Economic and Monetary Union’s
impact of issue salience and actor plurality, subsequently
triggering material and ideational considerations on gov-
ernment preferences towards the Financial Transaction
Tax introduction. By analysing the German, French and
Irish cases of domestic preference formation, she argues
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that the lack of consensus on the European level was
shaped by governments’ responsiveness towards both
societal dynamics and material interests within the
domestic societies of these member states.
Similarly, Högenauer (2021) studies the extent to
which the banking union was scrutinized by the French
andGerman parliaments and towhat degree this reflects
ideas and material interests. An analysis of parliamen-
tary salience and polarization shows that—in line with
public salience—the German Bundestagwas indeed a far
more active scrutinizer. However, the positioning of par-
liamentarians in the two countries is largely explained by
structural economic factors and the interests of domes-
tic banks.
Donnelly (2021) studies the degree of domestic sup-
port in German political parties for the country’s change
of stance on the issue of European grants to Member
States, and its impact on intergovernmental negotia-
tions on the Eurozone budget between 2018 and 2020.
He argues that Christian Democratic politicians and vot-
ers are likely to limit Germany’s support for a larger EU
budget or European grants in the future, despite Social
Democratic efforts to keep the door open.
Finally, the thematic issue endswith two articles look-
ing at the checks-and-balances in Eurozone governance
and the democratic nature of reforms.
Fontan and Howarth (2021) analyse the national-
level reaction to the problematic combination of the
ECB’s strong independence and ever broader interpre-
tation of its own mandate. Applying elements of a
principal-agent approach, they argue that the ruling of
the German Federal Constitutional Court of May 2020
demonstrates the relative importance of national—as
opposed to European-level—actors exercising ex-post
control over ECB policies.
Sebastião (2021) examines the democratic nature of
Eurozone governance reforms from an interdisciplinary
perspective and closes the thematic issue on a normative
note. She uses process-tracingmethodology to argue that,
while the Eurozone and Covid-19 crises evidenced differ-
ent kind of policy outcomes, the EU democratic deficit
remains. Economic crises convert economic power into
‘representative’ political power, thus perpetrating the
political over-hegemony of previous surplus economies.
Ideological debate is constrained and national interests
prevail over politicisation. Political representative power
and democracy are losing out in the process.
The contributions of this thematic issue highlight the
persistent divisions among Member States, the negative
impact on democracy of the crises and the latent distrust
within creditor states. They also provide insights into the
factors that shape Member State positions and the new
roles of several EU institutions in Eurozone governance.
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